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The Determinants of Arms Spending in 
South America  
Jorge M. Battaglino 
Abstract: In recent years, South America has witnessed a large increase in 
arms purchases. Nonetheless, there are important intraregional differences 
in terms of the allocation of resources for weapons acquisitions. How can 
we account for these disparities? Mainstream literature suggests that levels of 
arms importation depend on either the size of the defense budget or the 
perception of threat. In contrast, this article contends that the level of 
spending on arms is mainly determined by: (a) the expansive or nonexpan-
sive nature of the strategic assessment of defense, (b) the available resources 
allocated by the defense budget, and (c) the level of political attention to 
defense issues. Thus, the aim of this article is to account for and assess the 
determinants of the different levels of arms importation in South America 
from 2000 to 2011.  
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Introduction 
South American states are in the midst of a historical transformation charac-
terized by the combination of high rates of economic growth, the consolida-
tion of democratic regimes and the reduction of poverty. Brazil stands in the 
spotlight of this change. The country has just become the sixth largest econ-
omy in the world, surpassing Great Britain. This new economic and political 
landscape has been escorted by another novel trend: a regional wave of 
purchases of advanced military equipment.  
Arms purchases have greatly increased in South America in recent 
years, climbing by 150 percent since 2005 (SIPRI 2010). Chile is the main 
buyer, having imported USD 4.4 billion worth of weaponry between 2000 
and 2011, followed by Venezuela with USD 3.3 billion, Brazil with USD 2.7 
billion, Colombia with USD 1.8 billion and Argentina with USD 519 million 
(SIPRI 2011). An analysis of this expenditure as a percentage of GDP for 
the same time period reveals that Chile is also the country that spends a 
bigger proportion of its resources on arms (an average of 0.26 percent), 
compared to Venezuela (0.16), Colombia (0.08), Brazil (0.04) and Argentina 
(0.01). It should be noted that Brazil’s percentage does not take into account 
the recent announcements on arms purchases, which – if included – would 
increase arms spending to 0.28 percent of GDP between 2012 and 2016. 
The main aim of this article1 is to identify the factors that explain these 
different levels of arms spending in South America for the period 2000–
2011. I will analyze the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Ven-
ezuela. Together, these countries accounted for 94 percent of total arma-
ment imports into South America during the period analyzed.2 This period 
1  I am very grateful for the help and advice provided by Sebastían Etchemendy, 
German Lodola, Lucas Gonzalez, Christian Bonfili and Richard Hay.  
2  Military spending on armaments in South America can be analyzed using arms 
imports data. South American countries produce small quantities of arms and when 
they do, as in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, they tend to import their most ad-
vanced and expensive components. For that reason, arm import figures account for 
almost all of the additions of the most important items of military equipment of a 
state in South America in the analyzed period. (The most important items of mili-
tary equipment are combat aircrafts, helicopters, tanks and capital ships.) Moreover, 
the choice of arms imports spending as the dependent variable is based on the as-
sumption that this phenomenon, and not the overall rise in military budget, is the 
one that could generate increasing tensions in interstate relations. This leads us to 
dismiss defense spending as the variable to be analyzed since South American 
countries spend, on average, 85 percent of their defense budget on operations and 
maintenance. These two items can significantly increase defense spending (e.g., due 
to wage increases) and, yet, not necessarily increase other states’ perception of 
threat. By contrast, the rise in military spending by the purchase of weapons often 
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of study allows for a more nuanced control of the impact of the three inde-
pendent variables, as arms spending only increased significantly from 2005. 
The traditional literature on this subject argues that arms procurement 
levels are related to the absolute GDP value, the level of GDP growth, the 
size of the defense budget and the existence of security threats or moderni-
zation needs (Brzoska 2004; Smith and Tasiran 2005; Yakovlev 2007). The 
main claim of this article is that the different levels of arms purchases could 
be explained by the combining effect of three variables that are usually con-
sidered independently in the traditional literature on this subject: (a) the 
expansive or non expansive nature of the strategic assessment of defense 
(SAD); (b) the availability of budgetary resources for the defense area, which 
is in turn a result of the availability of economic resources; and (c) the de-
gree of political attention to defense issues.  
Therefore, a multidimensional approach is needed to overcome the lim-
itation of mainstream explanations. For instance, it would be possible to 
argue that countries with the highest weapons purchases in recent years are 
those with the highest defense budgets. In the period 2000–2011, however, 
an analysis of South American countries’ military budgets reveals that there 
is no relationship between total defense spending and weapons purchases. 
The country that allocates the most resources to its defense, Brazil, is only 
the third largest importer of weapons, whereas Chile, the biggest spender on 
arms in the region, has a military budget four times smaller than Brazil’s. 
Similarly, Venezuela is the second largest importer of weapons, but its mili-
tary budget is only the fourth largest. The Venezuelan budget is very similar 
to that of Argentina, the fifth largest weapons importer. 
Another possible approximation of weapon acquisitions is based on 
threat perceptions. This kind of approach emphasizes the existence of an 
arms race in the region. An arms race has been defined as a dynamic of 
action and reaction between two countries experiencing an intense security 
dilemma (Hammond 1993; Glaser 2000). However, the action-reaction pat-
tern so characteristic of an arms race is not present in the region. Countries 
like Peru and Colombia, which maintain border and ideological disputes 
with Chile and Venezuela, have not acquired weapons in response to pur-
chases made by their neighbors (SIPRI 2011). Moreover, in cases where 
military spending has increased, it is not apparent that external threat in the 
                                                                                                         
results in an increase of tensions and distrust. In this sense, this indicator is more 
accurate than the defense spending as a percentage of GDP, the defense spending 
in absolute terms, or as a percentage of government budgets. These indicators do 
not capture whether an increase in military spending reflects an arms procurement 
process or just allocation of resources to supply the armed forces’ operations and 
maintenance. 
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region played a role. Brazil and Chile, for instance, do not perceive signifi-
cant threats to their security in the region, yet have acquired large amounts 
of weapons. Meanwhile, Argentina has only procured a small amount of 
weaponry in spite of being surrounded by the more powerful armed forces 
of Brazil and Chile.
Other works suggest that the allocation of resources for defense can al-
so be driven by economic growth (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003; Freder-
iksen and Looney 1983; Hewitt 1991). Economic explanations assume that 
those countries experiencing higher economic growth should buy more 
weapons. This hypothesis could be complemented by the idea that countries 
with larger GDPs should spend more on arms than those with lower GDPs. 
However, data on average GDP growth between 2000 and 2011 and the 
position of countries by nominal GDP for the same period do not provide 
any clear pattern between the size of an economy and the amount of re-
sources allocated to the purchase of weapons. Arms procurement appears to 
be independent of a country’s size and its economic growth rates. For ex-
ample, Brazil’s GDP is the largest in South America and 10 times larger than 
Chile, yet Brazil is only the third largest importer of weapons in the region. 
The same applies to Venezuela, whose GDP is twice that of Chile. Argenti-
na has the second largest GDP and is the state that spends the least amongst 
the five analyzed countries. This order may possibly change in the near fu-
ture following Brazil’s announcement of a vast program of military modern-
ization. When the acquisitions finally take place, Brazil will become the 
number one importer of arms in the region in the coming years (0.28 per-
cent of GDP) – just ahead of Chile (0.26).  
The current literature is not only limited in its ability to explain the re-
cent wave of arms purchases, it has also neglected to analyze this phenome-
non in the South American context. Therefore, a key aim of this article is to 
fill this gap by arguing that those South American countries that have spent 
more resources on weapons are those (a) that have implemented an expan-
sive SAD, defined as one that favors the establishment of military missions 
that require a high level of expenditure on arms; (b) that have a high level of 
budget availability in the area of defense; and (c) where politicians, especially 
those who govern, are interested in defense issues.  
The article is divided into two sections. The first section develops the 
conceptual framework by explaining the three main variables: (a) SADs, (b) 
the availability of economic resources and its impact on the defense budget, 
and (c) the level of political attention to defense issues. Particular considera-
tion is given to the impact of military missions on the allocation of resources 
as well as to the interaction between variables a and b with c. The second 
section of the article is devoted to the analysis of the cases of Argentina, 
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Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela within the theoretical framework 
discussed here. 
Strategic Assessment of Defense, Political  
Attention to Defense Issues and Economic
Performance
The methodology to explain arms spending is focused on the interaction of 
three main variables whose impact on the final expenditure is rather differ-
ent. One variable, the SADs, operate by establishing a “spending demand,” 
which is the desirable amount of economic resources needed to buy the 
military equipment required to fulfill the missions derived from SADs. 
However, the final expenditure figure (i.e., the money that will be nominally 
allocated for arms acquisitions) is the result of “spending feasibility,” which 
is the outcome of both the availability of economic resources and the level 
of attention that politicians give to defense issues (see Figure 1). As will be 
seen, the availability of economic resources does not necessarily imply that 
those resources will be assigned to the defense budget. If this occurs, there 
is a situation of “budget availability.” Consequently, the scenario most fa-
vorable to high levels of arms expenditure will be one in which (1) the stra-
tegic assessment favors the adoption of military missions that demand the 
acquisition of expensive weapons, (2) there is budget availability to acquire 
weaponry, and (3) politicians are interested in defense – such as in the cases 
of Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. In the case of Argentina, despite the country 
having recently implemented a SAD that is expansive in spending in a con-
text of availability of economic resources, the lack of political attention has 
negatively affected resource availability in the defense budget and, in turn, 
the acquisition of weapons. Colombia can be located in an intermediate 
position with regard to armament expenditure given its adoption of a non-
intensive SAD together with the presence of political interest and budget 
availability (see Table 1 for a summary of the cases).  
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Figure 1: A Stylized Causal Assessment of Arms Determinants in South 
America
Source:  Author’s own compilation. 
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Strategic 
assessment of 
defense 
Expansive Expansive Nonex-pansive Expansive Expansive 
Availability of 
economic 
resources 
High High High High High 
Level of politi-
cal attention  Low Substantial Substantial Substantial Substantial 
Total budget 
availability 
(as a % of 
defense budg-
et)  
1.2 
6.5 
23 (after 
2012) 
15.9 33.7 17.1 
Arms spending 
as % GDP  0.01 
0.04 
0.28 (after 
2012) 
0.08 0.26 0.16 
Source:  Author’s own compilation. 
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Strategic Assessment of Defense and Spending 
Demand: The Role of Military Missions
The development of a strategic assessment is the final step of a policy-
making process that is shaped by a number of different variables, such as 
the organizational imperatives of the armed forces, the ideology of govern-
ments, the lobbying of companies, the role of parliaments, the type of civil-
military relations and even phenomena like corruption. Therefore, our main 
concern here is to account for the different levels of armament purchases 
based on the main missions derived from SADs, and not to analyze the 
factors that influence or determine its formulation. This approach is essen-
tial to tackle the multidimensional nature of the process of weapon purchas-
es in comparative research. The world of arms procurement is shaped by 
many actors who move in a context of high secrecy (Bromley and Solmirano 
2012). For this reason, the data determining that process is difficult to ob-
tain. This is why SADs are taken as a point of departure to identify the mili-
tary missions incorporated in it and their impact on the acquisition of weap-
ons. 
It is worth mentioning that the region has been taking different 
measures to improve the transparency of defense spending. Argentina and 
Chile developed a common methodology to measure defense expenditure in 
2001 with the support of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA). This initiative had no precedent worldwide and has had a great 
impact at the regional level, serving as the model for the common method-
ology developed by the South American Defense Council (SADC) to meas-
ure Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) defense spending. 
SADs normally include both military and nonmilitary diagnoses. The 
first type of diagnosis refers to the military and political elite’s perceptions of 
the defense challenges faced by a country and usually describes regional and 
world scenarios and identifies threats. In this respect, SADs set the frame-
work for the establishment of military missions. The second type of diagno-
sis refers to the importance of achieving nonmilitary goals. In Brazil, for 
example, defense has been incorporated into a project of national develop-
ment.  
Thus, the impact of SADs on arms procurement depends on their ori-
entation – that is, whether they are money consuming or expansive. Expan-
sive SADs entail a vision of defense issues that demands expensive weapons 
for one of two reasons: (1) military missions that require the use of sophisti-
cated weapons or (2) the domestic production of advanced military technol-
ogy. On the contrary, nonexpansive SADs are related to military missions that 
require the acquisition of cheaper weapons or with countries that are not 
 78 Jorge M. Battaglino 
interested in building a national industry of defense or the dominance of 
advanced technology.  
To sum up, military missions and political needs have a distinct budget-
ary impact as they require the acquisition or domestic development (via 
technology transfer) of sophisticated, more expensive weaponry.  
The impact that the armed forces’ missions have on arms imports has 
been scarcely studied. Military missions involve the acquisition of different 
kinds of weapons (i.e., sophisticated and low-tech equipment). Therefore, 
missions’ budgetary impacts vary given that their implementation is linked 
with different levels of spending. South American countries have assigned 
seven types of missions to their armed forces during the last decades: (1) 
military conflict with a great power, (2) military conflict with an equivalent 
state, (3) peace enforcement or multilateral operations under the framework 
of the UN or NATO, (4) counterinsurgency (COIN), (5) asymmetric war-
fare, (6) participation in peacekeeping operations, and (7) internal order and 
other domestic missions. 
Weapons spending increases in accordance with the scale of a mission. 
The first three missions are the most expansive in terms of spending as they 
involve the maintenance of a certain symmetrical relation with an adver-
sary’s military power. The search for symmetry does not necessarily imply 
reaching a balance of forces but the use of similar kinds of forces (i.e., the 
deployment of the same kind of weapons and tactics). The search for sym-
metry is expensive as it involves the acquisition of heavy conventional 
weapons such as ships, aircraft and tanks. Some middle and emerging pow-
ers in South America such as Brazil and Venezuela have designed a hybrid 
defense doctrine in which a conventional strategy coexists with an asymmet-
ric approach. Both countries have acquired last-generation weapons (essen-
tial for symmetrical disputes over airspace, sea and land) and lighter and 
individual equipment (essential for asymmetric resistance). Participating in 
UN Chapter VII peacekeeping enforcement operations or operating under 
NATO command requires the ability to deploy armed forces capable of 
interoperating with the most advanced armed forces; this demands major 
arms spending. 
COIN and asymmetric missions are characterized by a less intensive 
use of sophisticated weaponry and therefore demand less spending than the 
previous three missions. COIN operations essentially require the acquisition 
of individual weapons, equipment to increase the mobility of troops (heli-
copters) and COIN aircraft. The disparity in military power associated with 
asymmetric missions favors the acquisition of light military equipment nec-
essary to maintain a prolonged resistance against a far more powerful force 
(Arreguin-Toft 2005). The spending on asymmetric missions is less than that 
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needed for COIN missions given that the former implicitly accept an adver-
sary’s military superiority. In this context, the acquisition of helicopters or 
any type of aircraft is worthless for the fulfillment of the mission. 
Arms spending is somewhat lower when countries predominantly par-
ticipate in peacekeeping operations under the UN Chapter VI mandate. 
These operations generally require inexpensive, unsophisticated equipment 
such as individual weapons, light-armored vehicles and a few helicopters. 
Moreover, countries are only expected to devote a small percentage of their 
forces to such missions. Public security missions are those that generate the 
least amount of spending on arms because they do not require sophisticated 
weapons such as aircraft, ships or tanks. On the contrary, the acquisition of 
light weapons as well as the means of transport and communication is suffi-
cient. 
There appears to be a new trend in South American SADs, with four of 
the five analyzed cases adopting expansive-spending missions. This trans-
formation is related to a new regional security scenario that is linked, in 
particular, with the resolution of boundary disputes between Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile. This situation has been complemented by the gradual dé-
tente of two other major regional quarrels: (1) the Chilean-Peru maritime 
dispute, which has been submitted to the International Court of Justice at 
The Hague (both parties are to accept the forthcoming ruling) and (2) the 
deepening of Colombia and Venezuela’s period of cooperation following the 
election of President Santos. This new context has led to the progressive 
abandonment of regional conflict scenarios and their replacement by mis-
sions not related to such threats.  
The creation of the SADC, which is part of UNASUR, is itself a mani-
festation of this new trend in regional security. The SADC, South America’s 
first regional institution specialized in defense matters, is composed of the 
ministers responsible for defense for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The Declaration of Santiago de Chile states that the SADC is a forum for 
consultation, cooperation and coordination on defense. The SADC has 
established three main objectives that reflect the consensus of its members 
regarding the challenges that face the region: (a) consolidating South Ameri-
ca as a zone of peace, (b) creating a South American defense identity, and (c) 
generating consensus in order to strengthen regional defense cooperation.  
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Expenditure Feasibility I: Economic Resources 
and Budget Availability 
Alongside the transformation of strategic perceptions, the region has been 
experiencing a period of exceptional economic growth. Although SADs set 
the magnitude of potential spending, it is the availability of resources and 
the degree of political support that ultimately establishes the budget availa-
bility for defense.  
The availability of economic resources is mainly related to the econom-
ic capacity of a country to purchase weapons. Therefore, the allocation of 
resources for arms acquisition is mainly driven by economic growth (Hewitt 
1991). It is assumed that this capacity is higher when countries enjoy long 
periods of economic growth, which favor an increase in public spending. 
This is the case with all South American countries. Average GDP growth 
over the past 10 years has been 7.2 percent for Argentina, 4.2 for Brazil, 3.6 
for Chile and 4.9 for Venezuela (FMI 2011). Thus, the causal chain of high 
economic growth, the increase of public spending and the expansion of the 
defense budget would explain – together with an expansive SAD and politi-
cal attention – the regional trend of increased spending on arms.  
It is important to distinguish between budgetary and extrabudgetary 
funds for the acquisition of weapons, which together make up the total 
available defense budget. The total availability of resources can be defined as 
the sum of budgetary and extrabudgetary funds for the acquisition of weap-
ons and can be measured as a percentage of the defense budget. Budgetary 
funds are those resources of the defense budget allocated to procure arms, 
while the extrabudgetary funds are those funds not included in the defense 
budget but allocated for such purchases. Extrabudgetary funds may be es-
tablished by special laws, raised by bond issue or raised through foreign aid 
or loans. They can be identified from the information published by defense 
ministries, economic ministries as well as other sources, such as foreign 
governments that finance weapons purchases. Both types of funds were 
calculated from the annual military budget analyses of the fiscal years from 
1999 to 2011; the funds allocated for arms purchases were identified within 
each budget and then calculated as a percentage in relation to the overall 
budget (see Table 2).  
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Table 2:  Budgetary and Extrabudgetary Spending for the Purchase of  
Weapons 
Cases Types of Funds Budget and Extra 
Budget Availability 
(as % of Defense 
Budget) 
(Average 2000–
2010) 
Total Availability 
(Average 2000–2010) 
(Budgetary Plus Ex-
trabudgetary Re-
sources) 
As a % of Defense 
Budget 
Argentina Budgetary Funds 1.2 1.2 
Brazil 
(before 
2011) 
Budgetary Funds 6.5 6.5 
Brazil 
(after 
2012) 
Budgetary Funds 23 23 
Colombia 
Budgetary Funds 11.1 
15.9 
Extrabudgetary 
Funds 
- Plan Colombia 
- Estate Tax 
4.8 
Chile 
Budgetary Funds 24.4 
33.7 Extrabudgetary Funds 
- Copper Law 
9.3 
Venezuela 
Budgetary Funds 9.7 
17.1 Extrabudgetary funds 
- External Loans 
7.4 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
Expenditure Feasibility II: Political Attention to
Defense Issues
The political attention to defense issues is a key variable for explaining the 
likelihood that the “demand of spending” will actually be transformed into a 
real allocation of resources in the defense budget. Therefore, defense budget 
availability is one of the main indicators of political attention: the greater the 
political interest, the greater the predisposition to spend on defense.  
The literature has identified various conditions that promote political 
attention on defense issues – such as structural and social causes, those 
related to the type of regime transition and those emphasizing government 
ideology. Structural approaches argue that politicians have a greater interest 
in defense when the state experiences threats to their security (Desch 1996). 
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Conversely, the absence of threat is a factor that favors the civilian leader-
ship being less likely to be attentive to national security affairs; however, this 
lack of attention does not have political costs, because the state has assured 
its survival.  
Social approaches assume that politicians are driven by the interests of 
their constituents and parties. In this sense, their interest in defense matters 
is mainly determined by the political advantage they can obtain. This tends 
to happen given two different conditions. First, right or center-right constit-
uencies tend to support the existence of properly equipped and trained 
armed forces. In such constituencies, it is possible to expect the presence of 
political parties representing those sectors. Of course, low social interest in 
defense is unlikely to facilitate significant political attention to defense is-
sues. Second, the existence of a defense industry is an important source of 
employment and is thus a strong incentive for politicians take an interest in 
defense. This is because the social sectors that benefit from the existence of 
such industries represent an extremely attractive constituency for politicians. 
Thus, the maintenance and/or domestic production of arms is seen as a tool 
to attract votes (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007). 
Two other conditions have also been linked with political attention to 
defense issues. The literature on democratic transition holds that pacted 
transitions are associated with more military leverage during the phase of 
consolidation (O Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986). This is due to 
the negotiated character of the transition, which involves the acceptance – 
by the new civilian authorities – of military-run authoritarian enclaves or of 
certain prerogatives. In other cases, the amount of political power held by 
the armed forces, inherited from the transition, becomes an important lever-
age when setting the agenda for budget allocation (Zaverucha 2009). In both 
cases, the power and influence of the military compels politicians to be con-
cerned with defense issues. Furthermore, such transitions are associated 
with the presence of relevant center-right parties that tend to favor a high 
level of military spending and the maintenance of areas of military autono-
my.  
Politicians may also be interested in defense issues for ideological rea-
sons – that is, when their political projects include defense either because 
the military are perceived as an essential instrument for national develop-
ment or because they believe that the defense industry may contribute to job 
creation or achieve greater technological autonomy. 
The political attention dimension should be assessed in relation to 
SADs and the availability of resources. To better illustrate this point, it is 
worth comparing the cases of Chile and Colombia. Chile’s expenditure on 
weapons (USD 4.4 billion) far exceeds that of Colombia (USD 1.8 billion). 
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In both cases, there is budget availability and the political attention for de-
fense is grounded in institutional aspects (“Copper Law”) and the internal 
perception of threat. Therefore, the difference in SADs, which is more ex-
pansive in Chile, is the main explanatory factor for spending levels. The 
contrast is more striking in the case of Argentina, where an expansive SAD 
and an availability of economic resources have not been translated into 
budgetary availability for the purchase of arms due to a lack of political 
support for defense issues. 
Case Studies 
Brazil
The arms procurement announcements made by Brazil have been made 
possible by the convergence of three factors: (a) an expansive SAD, which 
includes a conflict scenario with a great power, favoring the purchase of last-
generation weapons; (b) an important budget availability as a result of con-
stant economic growth; and (c) political support for arms purchases. The 
Brazilian armed forces have considerably increased their military budget, 
which grew from USD 17.6 billion in 2003 to USD 34.2 billion in 2011. This 
budget increase has been accompanied by a series of major acquisitions. The 
most important purchases will be made from France under the military 
agreement signed in September 2009 for USD 18 trillion. The agreement 
includes the provision of 4 Scorpene submarines, the hull of a nuclear sub-
marine, 50 EC-725 helicopters and the possible option for 36 Rafale air-
crafts. There are other ongoing programs such as the construction of the 
KC-390 transport aircraft, the modernization of AMX-1 and Tucano planes, 
and the construction of the infrastructure to maintain nuclear submarines. 
With the announced purchases, Brazil will become the largest buyer of 
weapons in the region, reaching 0.28 percent of GDP between 2012 and 
2016. 
This wave of weapons acquisitions is related to the change in the stra-
tegic assessment of the country’s defense. For much of the twentieth centu-
ry, the Brazilian defense assessment was influenced by the likelihood of 
regional conflict. In fact, the Brazilian military’s main mission was to prepare 
for a military confrontation with Argentina. The perception of this threat 
began to subside in 1979, when both countries signed an agreement that 
ended their 13-year dispute over the Paraná River. In 1985, Presidents Sar-
ney and Alfonsin signed an agreement that covered nuclear issues and ener-
gy cooperation and set up a commission to examine economic cooperation. 
By virtue of these agreements, the historic rivalry between Argentina and 
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Brazil became an intense process of political, economic and military cooper-
ation, which continues today (Kacowicz 1998). 
This remarkable change in bilateral relations had an inevitable impact 
on the missions assigned to the armed forces. As Argentina ceased to repre-
sent a threat, the Amazonian region began to be identified in the early 1990s 
as the main security concern. Various official publications highlighted the 
growing interest in the defense of Amazonas, arguing the possibility of an 
invasion by a great power. In all of these documents, warnings concerning 
the malleability of the principle of sovereignty and the possible international 
intervention or the “Balkanization” of the Amazon were made. For exam-
ple, a publication by the Ministry of the Army in the early 1990s designated 
the Amazon as an area of strategic priority and predicted a confrontation 
with “an incontestably superior military power” through a strategy of re-
sistance (Marques 2004; Zirker and Filho 2000). 
This new approach became official in 1996 with the publication of the 
National Defense Policy (NDP). The document made explicit the aban-
donment of the possibility of conflict with Argentina and highlighted the 
importance of the Amazon to the security of Brazil. During Cardoso’s pres-
idency, the main mission assigned to the Brazilian military was based on a 
scenario of asymmetric resistance against the intervention of a great power 
in the Amazon. Nevertheless, the low rate of economic growth that Brazil 
experienced during the 1990s prevented the acquisition of sophisticated 
military equipment for the accomplishment of that mission (Zaverucha 
2005).  
The arrival of Luis Ignacio “Lula” Da Silva to the presidency in 2002 
elevated defense issues to the top of the public debate. For the first time in 
Brazilian history, a presidential candidate from the Left represented the 
preferred option for the Brazilian military. Lula’s proposals were the most 
convergent with the armed forces’ interests; his agenda was quite extensive 
and included an increase of the defense budget from 1 percent of GDP to 2 
percent within four years.  
Lula’s strategic appraisal departed from the approach of his predecessor 
by portraying US military and economic hegemony as prejudicial to the 
development and influence of Brazil (Duarte Villa and Trindade Viana 2010; 
Flemes 2011). Following this, the acceleration of the transition from US 
dominance to a multipolar order that favors Brazilian interests became the 
main goal of its foreign policy. This strategy has been defined as an “asser-
tive” project rather than the mere “acceptance of the guidelines set by the 
big power blocs” (Duarte Villa and Trindade Viana 2010: 25). This assertive 
orientation distinguishes Brazilian grand strategy from that of Venezuela, 
which contemplates a more radical confrontation with the United States.  
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If the NDP of 1996 represented the official confirmation of the elimi-
nation of the conflict hypothesis with Argentina, the new edition of the 
NDP (issued in 2005) officially confirmed a scenario of conflict that had 
been debated during the previous decade: the defense of the Amazon 
against a great power invasion.3 According to the NDP,  
in this century, disputes over maritime areas, the aerospace domain 
[…] freshwater sources and energy […] may be intensified. These is-
sues may lead to interference in internal affairs. 
Furthermore,  
the environmental issue remains a concern of humanity. Countries 
that possess high biodiversity, vast natural resources and vast areas to 
be incorporated into the production system may become the subject 
of international interest (Government of Brazil 2005).  
The new NDP incorporates the term “Blue Amazon,” which refers to the 
sea under Brazilian jurisdiction after the extension of the limits of the sea 
surface in the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
The publication of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2008 fur-
ther clarifies the mission issue by establishing the need to mount a hybrid 
defense to be implemented simultaneously against an invasion. Accordingly, 
flexibility must contribute to the preparation of the military “for an asym-
metrical warfare, especially in the Amazonian region, to be held against an 
enemy of superior military power.” Nevertheless, the navy and air force 
should also have conventional capabilities to “deny the use of the sea to any 
concentration of enemy forces approaching Brazil by sea”, or “secure local 
air superiority” (Government of Brazil 2008). These last objectives refer to a 
more symmetric phase of a military conflict that demands the deployment of 
advanced weapons, able to stand on equal footing against the most modern 
military arsenal of a great power. The recent discovery of offshore oil re-
serves significantly influenced the orientation of the NDS.  
The significant increase in military spending and arms purchases in 
Brazil after 2009 is related to the impact that the new SAD has had on the 
missions of the armed forces. It is one thing to have a conflict scenario with 
Argentina, but quite another to identify a great power as a potential adver-
sary. In the latter case, the pressure to acquire the latest equipment rises 
considerably. Therefore, the combination of an expansive strategic assess-
ment and the economic boom experienced since 2005 have set the stage for 
3  In Fact, 82.6 percent of the Brazilian military and 72.7 percent of civilians believe 
that the Amazon could be militarily occupied by a foreign power (Bitencourt and 
Costa Vaz 2009: 10). 
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the launch of major weapons programs in Brazil.4 Furthermore, this would 
not have been possible without the political support received from the gov-
ernment. 
However, given the low intensity of the perception of threat, it has not 
been the main cause of political support for arms purchases; there are other 
factors fuelling this interest. The first, and most relevant in terms of political 
attention, is that the ideology of Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) 
has favored the incorporation of defense into the strategy of national devel-
opment (Saint Pierre 2009). For instance, the NDS revives the desire for an 
autonomous national arms industry with a focus on developing high tech-
nology military equipment. Here, the interest extends beyond national secu-
rity to include civilian spin-offs from advanced military research and the 
ability to become a source of advanced weaponry for Southern countries 
wishing to avoid dependence on US or European suppliers. The NDS sup-
ports the strengthening of three strategic sectors: space, cyber-space and 
nuclear. The document states that “by its very nature, these sectors trans-
cend the division between development and defense, between civil and 
military” (Government of Brazil 2008: 6). It should be noted that political 
attention to defense issues also has an important social base as reflected by 
the fact that the Brazilian armed forces have a 68.4 percent approval rating, 
the highest among South American countries (LAPOP 2009).
Chile 
Chile is the Latin American country that has purchased more weapons in 
absolute terms as well as in relation to its defense budget and the size of its 
GDP. The most important items acquired by Chile were 8 second-hand 
frigates from the Netherlands and Great Britain, 2 Scorpene submarines, 
200 Leopard 2 tanks and 48 F-16 aircraft. As in the case of Brazil, Chile’s 
purchases were made possible by the convergence of an expansive strategic 
assessment, a high availability of funding (mainly provided through the 
Copper Law) and the political support for weapon acquisitions. 
Chile has experienced a process of change in its SAD, which essentially 
has been caused by the progressive disappearance of regional enemies and 
4  The importance of the “availability of economic resources” variable is evidenced by 
the fact that the poor economic performance of Brazil until 2005 severely restricted 
the purchase of advanced weapons. In fact, numerous military programs, like the 
acquisition of an advance combat aircraft, were cancelled in 2002 and 2003 due to 
economic restrictions. Conversely, the successful economic recovery, the growth of 
the GDP since 2006 (almost double that of the previous five years), has allowed the 
launch of a vast program of military modernization.  
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by their strategy of international economic insertion. For instance, territorial 
conflicts with Argentina were resolved in the 1990s, and the pending territo-
rial disputes with Bolivia and Peru are confined to diplomatic negotiations 
(Paz Millet 2008). In this sense, the transformation of the regional scenario 
of defense and the model of international insertion have been the main 
driving forces for the adoption of an expansive strategic assessment that led 
to the adoption of resource-intensive missions, which – combined with a 
remarkable cycle of economic prosperity and political support – has facili-
tated the higher regional availability of resources for weapons acquisitions 
(0.26 percent of the GDP).  
The progressive decline of regional threats has been one of the main 
determinants behind the transformation of Chilean strategic views. Until the 
mid-1980s, the worst scenario for Chilean strategists was a simultaneous 
military conflict with Argentina, Bolivia and Peru. Chile was on the brink of 
war with Peru in 1975, while the military confrontation with Argentina was 
averted at the last moment thanks to the Pope’s mediation in December 
1978 (Mares 2001). Chile continued to contemplate the possibility of a con-
ventional conflict with Argentina until 1994, when both countries managed 
to resolve their pending territorial disputes. This event marked the beginning 
of a period of growing political and military cooperation that has recently 
led to the formation of the first South American binational peacekeeping 
force: the Cruz del Sur (Southern Cross). 
Relations with Bolivia and Peru have improved considerably over the 
past 10 years (Yopo and Ruz 2011; Toche 2011). However, bilateral rela-
tions are still conditioned by the presence of unresolved territorial conflicts. 
Relations with Peru are in the midst of a period of tension due to the case 
brought by Peru to The Hague for the demarcation of maritime boundaries. 
Notwithstanding, military conflict is unlikely. This is because both countries 
have declared that they will accept the ruling of The Hague regardless of 
who prevails (La Tercera 2011). Moreover, Chile’s arms purchases have not 
received any response from Peru; this lack of reaction indicates that the 
Peruvian government considers the outbreak of war improbable. Further-
more, military and political cooperation in the framework of UNASUR has 
fostered a climate of trust and certainty that significantly reduces the possi-
bility of military confrontation between these countries. 
The reduction of interstate threat perception has been reflected in the 
most recent Chilean white paper on the matter. Whereas the 2002 edition 
states, in reference to the regional situation, that “it would be premature to 
argue that interstate conflict has disappeared because there are still some 
pending territorial issues,” the 2010 edition omits this statement and refers, 
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instead, to the increasing levels of economic, political and military coopera-
tion between Bolivia, Chile and Peru (Government of Chile 2002: 49–50). 
Although a scenario of a conventional conflict with Peru is still one of 
the missions of the Chilean military, its improbability has encouraged the 
search for new missions. This quest is not only rooted in the progressive 
disappearance of regional threats, but also in a new international stance of 
Chilean elites, who “have abandoned completely regional isolationism and 
belligerence as the primary means of effectuating Chilean national and secu-
rity interests” (Martin 2010). This perspective is based on the model of in-
ternational economic insertion that is grounded in the search and consolida-
tion of new international markets to sustain long-term domestic growth. In 
this respect, Chile has become a regional actor with global interests and has 
signed a total of 47 free trade and economic association treaties. In this 
sense, national interests are conceived in terms of the maintenance of the 
economic conditions that have fostered political and economic stability 
since the restoration of democracy in 1990. These conditions can be main-
tained only if the international system is secure and stable. The relevant 
white paper from 2010 contends that Chilean economic success rests on the 
“existence of international stability and peace,” and that the security of Chile 
“depends on problems that arise in remote settings, but radiate to us” (Gov-
ernment of Chile 2010: 2). 
A recent trend of adopting NATO military standards sheds light on the 
future orientation of military missions in Chile. The arms purchases made by 
Chile during the last five years have transformed its military into the only 
one in the region that meets NATO standards (Duarte Villa 2008; Holtom, 
Bromley, and Wizeman 2008: 305). This could be analyzed as a way to con-
tinue building a relationship with NATO that has, in fact, already begun at 
different levels. For instance, in May 2009, a workshop was developed on 
NATO cataloging, with the aim of implementing a classification system in 
accordance with the standards of the NATO Codification System (Riquelme 
2009). Moreover, Chile’s relationship with NATO is also defined by the 
framework of its participation in the EUFOR ALTHEA peacekeeping 
force; Chile is the only non-NATO country that participates in this mission 
(Government of Chile 2008).  
Chilean participation is highly valued by politicians across the entire po-
litical spectrum, revealing a broad consensus behind acquiring NATO 
standards. For example, the Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs and 
Defense have unanimously supported the decision to maintain the deploy-
ment of members of the armed forces in the NATO mission on the grounds 
that Chile’s participation is of great importance for both the military and the 
country (Senate of Chile 2010).  
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Senator Larrain said that “the fact of being integrated into NATO has a 
very important value for our country and our armed forces and that compels 
us to have European standards” (Senate of Chile 2009). Meanwhile, Rodolfo 
Codina Diaz, former commander in chief of the navy (2005–2009), noted 
that “in terms of professional preparation Chile is among the best in the 
world and it has a NATO standard” (Espinoza 2009). 
It is important to note that Chile’s approximation to NATO cannot be 
dissociated from its process of developing the new strategic concept, culmi-
nating in 2010 with the publication of NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic 
Engagement. The report states the need to adopt a new strategic concept 
given that the world has changed significantly since the current concept was 
adopted in 1999 (NATO 2010). According to that view, facing new threats 
requires the adoption of a new vision. This document establishes two im-
portant points that contextualize the Chilean strategy. First, the document 
defines a new geography by giving much more importance to the South 
Atlantic.5 Second, the paper emphasizes the need for the organization’s 
greater global presence (Nazemroaya 2007). Therefore, the secretary general, 
Anders Rasmussen, said during the presentation of the report in May 2010 
that “NATO should take a dynamic commitment beyond the treaty area in 
order to minimize threats” (Martinez de Rituerto 2010). From this perspec-
tive, NATO should not exclude the possibility of including allies who share 
the basic goals of the organization and possess significant military capabili-
ties that may assist NATO. For instance, the current US representative to 
the NATO Council, Ivo Daalder, strongly supports the idea of expanding 
NATO to invite other nations, thus making it a global organization (Daalder 
and Lindsay 2007). Moreover, some authors propose “to transform NATO 
from a pact between North American and European countries into a global 
alliance of free nations with the inclusion of countries like Japan, Australia, 
India, Chile and other stable democracies” (Marshall 2009). 
It is quite likely that the acquisition of NATO military status is related 
to Chile’s perception of this organization’s possible orientation in the near 
future. If NATO expansion to the South finally happens, Chile will be in a 
position to take advantage of it, thanks to its military capacity. Although this 
type of mission has not yet been formalized, its adoption would be func-
tional to the interests of both civilians and the military. From a political 
standpoint, this type of mission is functional to the maintenance of interna-
tional stability and peace, which are seen as prerequisites for the model of 
economic insertion. In military terms, such a mission serves the organiza-
5  This vision follows the reaction of Brazil’s defense minister: “Brazil and South 
America cannot accept that the US and NATO assume the right to intervene any-
where in the world” (Mathieu and Niño Guarnizo 2011: 54–55). 
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tional and professional interests of the armed forces because it requires the 
acquisition of sophisticated weaponry.  
Chile has recently taken another step toward upgrading its military ca-
pabilities so that it is capable of participating in multilateral missions both in 
the framework of NATO and in peacekeeping operations. In 2011, the first 
amphibious expeditionary brigade was created, which is the first of its kind 
in Latin America. This is a rapid deployment force composed of four battal-
ions of marines and a strategic projection ship. In terms of size and firepow-
er, this force is clearly different from the Cruz del Sur, whose main purpose 
is to participate in traditional peacekeeping missions. 
It is important to note that the institutions inherited from the military 
regime have encouraged a high level of defense budget availability. The 
Chilean political system maintains two budgetary institutions inherited from 
Pinochet’s military regime: an extrabudgetary fund (the Copper Law) and a 
fixed military budget (Weeks 2003).6 Both measures yielded an average of 
33.7 percent of the defense budget for weapons acquisitions between 2000 
and 2011. Consequently, spending on arms imports has been high, averaging 
0.26 percent of GDP since 2000.  
Venezuela
The Caribbean country has experienced a significant change in its SAD in 
the last years. Until the late 1990s, the main mission assigned to the Vene-
zuelan military was the preparation for a conventional conflict with Colom-
bia. This perception of threat changed drastically after the 2002 coup at-
tempt, when Chavez alleged US involvement (Jacome 2006). Since then, the 
United States has been perceived as the main threat to Venezuela’s security 
– although a conventional conflict with Colombia has not been completely 
ruled out. The danger of a military conflict with the United States has been 
the main cause for the transformation of Venezuelan military doctrine and 
organization (Trinkunas 2005).  
The scenario of a military conflict against the United States entails a 
conventional component and an asymmetric component. The latter con-
templates the implementation of a strategy of national resistance for a pro-
longed period of time against an invasion from the United States. Venezue-
lan military officers studied asymmetric warfare in Vietnam and Iraq and 
incorporated the new doctrine into all military academies in only six months. 
6  In June 2012, the Chilean House of Representatives repealed the “Copper Law” 
and passed a new law that established a 12-year defense budget and set up a strate-
gic contingency fund, which will allow the armed forces to meet unforeseen spend-
ing arising from external threats or national disasters. 
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Chavez stressed that asymmetric resistance must be developed “in every 
neighborhood, every island, in every field, at every university, in every facto-
ry […] in each place where there are a group of patriots” (Chavez 2006). 
Some of the arms recently purchased are clearly related to a scenario of an 
asymmetric conflict. For instance, in mid-2007, Venezuela acquired 5,000 
sniper rifles from Moscow. In addition, Russia delivered as many as 1,800 
shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles to the Venezuelan military (Washington 
Post 2010).  
This position has been reflected in various official documents. For ex-
ample, the Bolivarian Constitution reflects the regime’s perspective on 
popular participation in national defense by developing the concept of “in-
tegral popular national defense” (Jacome 2010). The integrality refers to the 
organization of civil society in armed militias – which are able to cooperate 
with the military – fighting in urban and rural areas in a decentralized and 
indefinite manner. In July 2008, the Organic Law of the Bolivarian National 
Armed Force was passed, which created the National Militia composed of 
the National Reserve and the Territorial Militia. This militia was meant to 
complement the Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB) in the “integral 
defense of the Nation” (Jacome 2010). It is estimated that the militia’s 
members totaled 1.5 million in 2010, while the total strength of FANB is 
129,150. 
Therefore, although Venezuela has bought equipment to maintain – at 
least for a short period of time – a conventional conflict with a great power, 
it has also acquired material for sustaining an asymmetric resistance. This 
combination of missions is intensive in resources because it demands the 
acquisition of some of the most advanced weapons, such as the Su-30MK 
combat aircraft or the S-300 air defense system.  
The political support for arms spending is significant in this case be-
cause of the strong perception of threat posed by the United States. Moreo-
ver, the military origin of its president and the process of militarization of 
the state, which includes the military control of the Ministry of Defense, 
have created a more favorable ideological context for the acquisition of 
weapons. Besides that, the high economic growth experienced by Venezuela 
since 2002 has also been a contributory factor to the decision to allocate 
17.1 percent of the defense budget to weapons acquisitions between 2000 
and 2011. 
In the Venezuelan case, extrabudgetary resources – in particular long-
term Russian loans – have been fundamental for the acquisition of equip-
ment. In 2005, Russia replaced the United States and Europe as the main 
supplier of military equipment to Venezuela. There are two prominent phas-
es in relation to purchases from Russia. Between 2005 and 2007, Venezuela 
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and Russia signed 12 contracts for the supply of arms worth between USD 
3–4.4 billion (Bromley and Guevara 2010). These deals covered the acquisi-
tion of 10 Mi-35 combat helicopters, 3 Mi-26 heavy helicopters, 40 Mi-17 
helicopters, 100,000 AK-103 rifles and 24 Su-30MK combat aircrafts. The 
second phase began in September 2009 when Russia agreed to loan Vene-
zuela over USD 2.2 billion to finance the purchase of weapons. There has 
been a lot of speculation about which weapons will be bought with this loan; 
Venezuela has shown an interest in TOR-M1 SAM systems, T-72 tanks, Su-
35 jet fighters and S-300 air defense systems. 
Colombia 
The strategic assessment in the case of Colombia has been largely condi-
tioned by the long duration of its internal conflict. The Colombian armed 
forces have been engaged in a conflict against several guerrilla movements 
since the mid-1960s. However, the possibility of an armed clash with Vene-
zuela remained its main mission until the late 1980s. Thereafter, the increase 
in both the size and firepower of the two main guerrilla groups (the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] and the National Liberation 
Army [ELN]) has determined Colombian armed forces’ main mission. The 
growing power and mobility of the guerrillas led to the design and imple-
mentation of the Plan Colombia in 1998, which represents the most im-
portant effort to modernize the armed forces in the country’s history (Leal 
Buitrago 2006).  
Since 2000, the Colombian state has launched a sustained offensive 
against guerrillas. Plan Colombia included, inter alia, a substantial increase in 
the number of helicopters and military units trained in COIN tactics. Heli-
copters, new units and the support of COIN aircrafts were fundamental 
both in deterring the mobilization of guerrillas and in substantially reducing 
guerrilla numbers. This initiative acquired a new impulse after President 
Uribe took power in 2002. Uribe was the first president who made security 
the primary focus of his government program. He implemented a policy of 
“democratic security” that included several major strategic objectives, such 
as the consolidation of the state’s control over the territory, the protection 
of the population and the elimination of the illicit drug trade (Government 
of Colombia 2003). As a matter of fact, the policy of democratic security 
had an immediate impact on the military budget, which jumped from sixth 
place in the region in 1990 to second place in 2011. 
The Colombian case shows how a nonexpansive SAD, which is based 
on a COIN mission, explains low-level spending on arms. For instance, 
although the Colombian military budget is now double that of Chile, its 
weapons imports are three times lower – 0.08 percent compared to 0.26 
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percent. Considering the context of sound economic performance and the 
strong interest that politicians have in defense issues, the low spending on 
weapons can only be explained by the type of SAD. The pattern of weapons 
purchases in Colombia mainly reflects the needs of a COIN conflict. The 
fact that only a few weapon systems have been acquired in recent years 
indicates that the perceived threat of military conflict with the Venezuela is 
very low.7  
Colombia has systematically used various types of extrabudgetary funds 
for the purchase of armaments; the main funds have come from the Plan 
Colombia and from various national taxes. Thanks to the funding of the 
Plan Colombia, a helitransport brigade was organized and the funds put 
toward the purchase of 95 helicopters. Plan funds have also enabled the 
purchase of a wide variety of light equipment for COIN operations. Like-
wise, the Colombian government widely used the so-called patrimony tax 
between 2002 and 2004. These resources were used to purchase 25 EMB-
314 COIN aircraft from Brazil and for the organization of new military 
units (Government of Colombia 2011). 
Argentina
The expenditure on weaponry in Argentina was the lowest in the region for 
the period analyzed (0.01 percent of GDP). Despite the economic boom 
that the country has been experiencing since 2003 and the recent design of 
an expansive defense strategy, there has been a lack of political support for 
military spending. In fact, politicians and society have exhibited a notable 
lack of interest in defense issues since 1983, which can be attributed to the 
political, economic and military failure of the last military dictatorship 
(1976–1983). Defeat in the Malvinas War coupled with the deep economic 
crisis and massive human rights violations committed by the regime finally 
resulted in the downfall of a culture of militarism and praetorianism that had 
characterized the Argentine political system during previous decades. It is 
noteworthy that society’s trust in the military collapsed and has remained the 
lowest of all Latin American countries since (LAPOP 2009). Certainly, low 
social interest in defense is definitely not a favorable setting for significant 
political attention to defense issues (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007). This 
context of disinterest is further affected by the absence of imminent threats 
to its security. 
7  Colombia recently brought 13 Kfir C-10 from Israel. However, they are third 
generation fighters with somewhat inferior capacities than the Venezuelan SU 
30MKII. 
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The new SAD adopted by Argentina is expansive because it identifies 
the defense of natural resources as one of the main missions for the military. 
Since the region is witnessing a process of generalized waning of conflict, 
the only actor who can threaten those resources is an extraregional state. 
Therefore, the new Argentine SAD follows the new regional trend of in-
cluding a scenario of conflict with an extraregional power, as in the cases of 
Brazil and Venezuela. In 2009, Argentina endorsed the Directive of National 
Defense Policy (DNDP), which was the first official document on defense 
strategy since the restoration of democracy. The DNDP has defined the 
international context as being characterized by “increasing complexity” and 
“a marked asymmetry in the military capabilities of states.” The DNDP 
warns that “the consolidation of practices of cooperation has not led to the 
renunciation by any country to deploy and organize a military force that 
would ensure an autonomous defense capability” (Government of Argentina 
2009). It affirms the need to examine the risks and threats to national inter-
ests in relation to the overall strategic situation. It also argues the need to 
adapt the missions of the military to such threats and to provide them with 
the necessary resources. 
It is possible to infer, from the emphasis given in presidential and min-
isterial speeches, that the defense of natural resources has become the main 
perceived risk. In this regard, President Kirchner has repeatedly mentioned 
the importance of defending natural resources:  
Together with you, I’m going to build the national defense system 
that requires the world to come, which is not a world divided between 
ideologies, but on the contrary, [...] where the point is the defense of 
our natural resources. [...] The defense and protection of our natural 
resources is important for Argentineans, Brazilians, Venezuelans, 
Chileans, Uruguayans, Bolivians, Ecuadorians as a region producing 
energy and food (Government of Argentina 2008). 
The emphasis on the protection of natural resources has been reiterated by 
the president in all camaraderie dinners with the armed forces8 and was 
incorporated into the 2010 national defense white book:  
Any aggression against a country of our region because of their natu-
ral resources affects the strategic interests of our country. South 
America is a land of both human potential and enormous cultural and 
natural wealth. South America has 44 percent of the natural reserve of 
water on the planet, 25 percent of the cultivated land and approxi-
mately 26 percent of oil and gas reserves. Therefore, the armed forces 
8  The camaraderie dinner is the most important meeting that the president has with 
the armed forces and it is commonly used to make policy relevant announcements.  
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should be on alert to protect sovereignty (Government of Argentina 
2010: 4). 
However, this expansive assessment and the availability of resources have 
had no impact on the purchase of advanced equipment. As it has been ar-
gued, this is because the political interest is lower than in other countries in 
the region. Nevertheless, the case of Argentina reveals the importance of 
understanding that the purchases of sophisticated weaponry cannot be taken 
as the unique indicator of political attention. On the contrary, this interest 
can be fueled by ideological considerations related to the contribution of 
defense to the model of development.  
It is precisely in the latter direction that defense issues in Argentina 
have started to receive increasing political attention in the last few years. 
This is evidenced by the fact that military spending has considerably in-
creased since 2005, the arms industry has been reactivated, and a new na-
tional defense strategy has been defined for the first time since the return to 
democracy in 1983. The reason for the new political interest in defense 
issues can be traced back to the ideological orientation of the governments 
of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The increase in 
military spending is a direct result of the implementation of a neodevelop-
mentalism program (Moreira Cunha and Ferrari 2009; Wylde 2010). The 
Argentine version of neodevelopmentalism involves substantive wage in-
creases as a tool to increase aggregate demand, which is perceived by the 
government as an essential condition to boost the internal market and in-
dustry. Therefore, the significant increase in defense spending has been a 
direct result of the expansion of the aggregate demand policy promoted by 
constant wage increases in the state and private sectors. The armed forces 
have not been exempted from these increases given the significant number 
of military and civilian personnel. The military budget has grown 190 per-
cent since 2003, from USD 1.7 billion in 2003 to USD 5 billion in 2012 
(Resdal 2012). 
Similarly, the implementation of a neodevelopmentalist strategy has had 
a positive impact on the reconstruction of the defense industry, which was 
perceived as an area that could contribute to job creation and to the devel-
opment of dual-use advanced technologies. The process of recovery has 
been developed into three main areas: (1) the nationalization and moderni-
zation of different companies that were privatized during the 1990s, (2) the 
development of programs to modernize existing military equipment, and (3) 
the design and manufacture of military equipment with different levels of 
technological complexity. For instance, the main naval projects recently 
announced were the building of a nuclear submarine and the modernization 
of 10 MEKO combat ships. Similarly, the Military Aircraft Factory of Cór-
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doba, which was privatized in 1995, was renationalized in December 2009. 
Currently, its efforts are dedicated to the production of 40 Pampa aircraft 
and the modernization of the Pucara COIN aircraft. Other ongoing projects 
include the design and manufacture of a training plane (IA-73) and the pro-
duction of components for the KC-390 transport aircraft, under an agree-
ment signed with Embraer of Brazil.  
Finally, private and state companies in collaboration with research cen-
ters of each branch of the armed forces are in the process of building or 
designing advanced military technology, such as long-range surveillance 
radars, a nuclear submarine, tier II and III unmanned aerial vehicles, com-
munications and observation satellites, and a medium-range cruise missile; 
they are also relaunching the rocket program for civilian (Tornado) and 
military use (Gradicom) and modernizing both the Aspide and Exocet mis-
siles. 
It is important to note that while neodevelopmentalist strategies have 
contributed to an increase in military spending and to the reconstruction of 
the defense industry, they have not promoted the acquisition of sophisticat-
ed weapons – despite the implementation of an expansive SAD. This may 
be due to the recent implementation of the strategy or to the fact that the 
political interest in defense issues is mainly linked to the development di-
mension of defense policy. 
Concluding Remarks  
The amount of a South American country’s arms imports is independent of 
the size of its military budget, the total amount of its GDP and the percep-
tion of threat. Rather it is the interaction among the type of SAD, budget 
availability and political support for defense issues that ultimately determines 
the different levels of weapons spending as a percentage of GDP.  
In this regard, the region is experiencing a convergence of factors that 
have favored arms spending in recent years. This is mainly due to the fact 
that four of the five countries analyzed have incorporated military missions 
that are expansive in terms of spending. This change in the configuration of 
military missions has been fostered by the gradual disappearance of border 
disputes. In South America, most of these conflicts have been resolved or 
are in the process of being so. 
Ecuador and Peru signed a peace treaty in 1998 that resolved the last 
dispute between the two countries, while Chile and Peru have submitted 
their maritime dispute to The Hague; both have declared that they will ac-
cept the court’s ruling. Recurrent conflicts between Colombia and Venezue-
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la have been successfully contained and resolved in the framework of 
UNASUR.  
This, of course, is a positive feature that reinforces the definition of the 
region as a zone of peace. From a national defense point of view, however, 
the disappearance of traditional conflict scenarios (i.e., the envisaged military 
clashes between neighboring countries) represents a challenge in terms of 
the so-called deficit of threat (Buzan 2006). Preventing such a deficit has 
been one of the main incentives for the adoption of expansive SADs. The 
most significant evidence of this reconfiguration has been the increasing 
adoption of military missions that reflect perceived extraregional threats or 
the possibility of deploying armed forces outside the region. 
The missions performed by South American armed forces can also help 
us identify the intensity of the threat that is perceived by a country and its 
origin. The decrease in intraregional threats refutes the views that define 
arms purchases as the result of an arms race. South American countries are 
buying weapons, but do not do so in response to their neighbors’ purchases. 
This is evidenced by the lack of response from Colombia to Venezuela’s 
arms purchases and from Argentina to Brazil’s and Chile’s purchases. In 
addition, Peru has not responded to the significant acquisitions made by 
Chile, a country with which it maintains a boundary dispute. 
The region is at a unique stage in its history, characterized by increasing 
levels of cooperation in the realm of defense. There are two factors related 
to the new pattern. First, the participation of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 
the joint peacekeeping operation in Haiti has fostered the daily interaction of 
hundreds of members of the armed forces from these three countries, thus 
contributing to the development of bonds with and sense of belonging to 
the region. Second, the SADC was established with the mandate to create a 
South American identity on defense. These ongoing processes cannot be 
dissociated from the reformulation of SADs and regional arms purchases, 
which are essentially political phenomena. Their significance, therefore, 
should be sought in that dimension. To do otherwise would be to seek a 
reductionist explanation of a complex and diverse phenomenon.  
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Los determinantes de las compras de armamento en América del Sur 
Resumen: América del Sur ha experimentado un incremento considerable 
en las compras de armamento en los últimos años. Sin embargo, existen 
notables diferencias intrarregionales en términos de los recursos que se han 
destinado a la adquisición de tal equipamiento ¿Cómo podemos explicar 
tales disparidades? La literatura predominante sobre el tema sostiene que los 
niveles de importación de armamento dependen principalmente de la inten-
sidad de la percepción de amenaza o del monto destinado al presupuesto de 
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la defensa. En contraste, este artículo postula que el nivel de gasto en armas 
es determinado por los siguientes factores: (a) la naturaleza expansiva o no 
expansiva de la apreciación estrategia de la defensa, (b) la disponibilidad de 
recursos económicos que se destinan al presupuesto militar, y (c) el nivel de 
atención política que reciben los temas de defensa. En este sentido, el prin-
cipal objetivo de este trabajo es explicar y evaluar los determinantes de los 
distintos niveles de importación de armamento en América del Sur entre los 
años 2000 y 2011.  
Palabras clave: América del Sur, compras de armamento, apreciación estra-
tégica, recursos económicos, política de defensa 
